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Abstract 
The Icesave dispute Iceland fought with the UK and Dutch 
governments reviled inhered weakness of the European financial 
system. Bringing forward tension of legal division between public and 
private law and falling outside framework of traditional neatly 
compartmentalized law the ambiguity of responsibilities was testing 
understandings and interpretations of international relations. The paper 
explores how larger and more powerful countries were politically able 
to pressure a much smaller state in time of crisis into abiding to their 
own interpretation of law and in doing so rallying behind them support 
of international organizations like the EU and the IMF. In January 2013 
the EFTA Court finally ruled on the issue, vindicating Iceland of 
wrongdoing and refusing the UK, Holland and the EU’s claim. Studying 
the Icesave dispute contributes to understandings of production of 
international legality trough practices and contested interpretations in 
the international realm.1 
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Introduction  
 
The legal and political dispute Iceland fought with the UK and Dutch 
governments over responsibilities of deposits in the fallen cross border 
Icesave Bank in wake of the international financial crisis – which hit Iceland 
severely hard in autumn 2008 when its three over sized international banks 
fell – not only reviled inhered weakness of the European financial system but 
also led to profound crisis of diplomacy during the Credit Crunch. Bringing 
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forward tension of legal division between public and private law and falling 
outside framework of traditional neatly compartmentalized law the ambiguity 
of responsibilities was testing understandings and interpretations of 
international law in cross border finance. Not fitting squarely within EU- 
diplomatic- or financial law it can be argued that the case in its process 
illustrates contested and hybrid construction of legality as here is explored. 
This is furthermore evident in how larger and more powerful countries were 
politically able to pressure a much smaller state in time of crisis into abiding to 
their own interpretation of law and in doing so rallying behind them support of 
international organizations like the EU and the IMF.  
The Icesave dispute was thus not only a matter of international law, but 
rather also a case of contestation between cross border actors over 
determination of authority during the crisis. By empirically studying the 
Icesave dispute this paper discusses a profound crisis of diplomacy and 
processes of international legality of the financial sector during the Credit 
Crunch. This can be coined as case of perfect legal storm in international 
relations; a crisis of public international law, diplomatic law, EU law and 
finance law. This case study traces the dynamics of how international legality 
is produced and remade during the course of this particular inter-state crisis 
and in doing so thus contributes to analysis of procession construction of 
international legality.  
The study deals with interpretive contest in international relations on 
what is considered legal, in this particular instance dispute of responsibility 
over guarantying deposits of fallen cross border bank. In this case intersecting 
practices and expertise were to revolve in a struggle over cross border 
insolvency law. By pressuring the Icelandic government into accepting 
responsibility of the fallen bank in UK and Holland this was an international 
push towards sovereignization of private debt through twists of circumstances 
and practise.  
 In its core, perhaps, this is a study of struggle over who decides 
authoritative interpretations of what in this particular instance is understood as 
international legality, which is constructed, construed and contested through 
multi-actor and multi-level interaction of multi-national relations. 
The Crisis 
Iceland was the first victim of the of the global Credit Crunch when its three 
international banks came tumbling down in October 2008, amounting to one 
of the world’s greatest national financial crises. This was a financial tsunami 
without precedent. Glitnir Bank was the first to run into trouble when planned 
nationalization was announced on 29. September 2008. On the basis of 
emergency laws rushed through Parliament Landsbanki was taken into 
administration On October 7th. The following day then British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown invoked the UK Anti-Terrorism Act (passed after ‘9/11’ in 2001) 
to freeze all Icelandic assets in the UK. This was, he argued, to protect UK 
depositors in the bank. That act however killed of Iceland’s last and largest 
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bank still standing, Kaupthing. The vastly oversized Icelandic financial system 
was wiped out. Iceland is one of the smallest countries in the world and 
borders on being a microstate with just over 300,000 inhabitants. However, 
this experience ranks third in the history of the world’s greatest bankruptcies 
(Halldórsson & Zoega, 2010). Iceland also responded significantly differently 
to the troubles than most other states, allowing its financial system to default 
rather than throwing good money after bad. 
Iceland had few good options. The IMF would not consider its loan 
application until the dispute with the UK and Dutch governments over the 
Icesave deposits accounts was settled. The fallen Landsbanki had set up 
these deposit accounts in those countries, leaving many of their citizens 
without access to their money. Even though the Icelandic government 
steadfastly argued that it wasn’t legally at fault and that the state would fulfill 
all its legal obligations regarding Icesave, the IMF wouldn’t budge. Iceland 
was being pressured by the UK and Dutch governments, which were backed 
by the whole EU apparatus.  
This was a staring contest Iceland could not afford to drag out. Early 
agreements in October and November 2008, first so-called Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Dutch government and then a more broad based 
Brussels Guidelines, which included EU involvement, were signed by 
Icelandic ministers in order for the IMF to be allowed to be brought in to 
stabilize the economy, not least through the introduction of capital controls 
and the co-funding of a loan package with the Nordic and Polish 
governments. By mid 2009, after change in government, these early 
agreements were abandoned for bilateral agreement with the finance 
ministries of Holland and the UK, where Iceland accepted responsibilities for 
deposits of the fallen bank. In an extraordinary move the President, however, 
refused to sign the bills, referring them to referendums, in which they were 
rejected by large majority, spurring one of the greatest international disputes 
Iceland had ever fought.  
Not only was Iceland denied any access to united efforts within Europe 
to bailout banks but the UK and Holland were able use their position within the 
EU to pressure Iceland to accept their own interpretation of EU laws Iceland 
was to follow. Though ambiguity still remained as to who was legally liable for 
the loss, the UK government was using all means available to pressure 
Iceland to accept responsibility. 
On 28 January 2013, the EFTA Court finally ruled on the case, 
concluding that no state guaranties were in place on the deposits and, thus, 
dismissing the claim of the British and Dutch authorities (Judgment of the 
Court, 2013). The ruling vindicated the Icelandic state of wrongdoing. In early 
2014 the Dutch and the Brits filed claim against only the privately held 
Icelandic Depositors Guaranty Fund before local court in Reykjavik.   
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An systemic flaw 
The collapse of the Icelandic banks clearly revealed a serious weakness in 
the European banking passport system, a macroeconomic imbalance within 
the Single European Market. It was a weakness that some of the more 
established banking nations had warned against when the system was being 
constructed (for more, see Benediktsdottir, Danielsson, & Zoega, 2011). The 
main flaw lay in the fragmented nature of supervision on an otherwise 
common market – European-wide regulation but only local supervision. This 
had caused a mismatch between access to market and adequate supervision.  
 There was also an inhered flaw in the setup of Iceland’s link to the EU 
through the EEA agreement. Being in the Single European Market through the 
European Economic Area agreement (EEA) but outside the fence of EU 
institutions left Iceland without shelter when the crisis hit. This neither-in-nor-
out arrangement – with one foot in on the Single European Market, with all the 
obligations that entailed, and the other foot outside the EU institutions, and 
therefore without access to back-up from, for example, the European Central 
Bank – proved to be flawed when the country was faced with a crisis of this 
magnitude: The oversized Icelandic banks were operating in a market that 
included 500 million people but with a currency and a Central Bank that was 
backed up by only roughly 330,000 inhabitants. As a participant in the EU 
Single Market, Iceland was inside the European passport system so the 
banks were able to operate almost like domestic entities throughout the 
continent.  
Landsbanki had in 2002 acquired the British Heritable Bank and in 
2005 furthermore opened separate subsidiary in London. However when 
marketing the Icesave deposit accounts in October 2006 Landsbanki decided 
to bypass both and instead opened a branch collecting the deposits. This was 
done to be able to transfer the money upstream to the mother company in 
Iceland (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 8), something the subsidiary system does 
not allow. Furthermore, branches were under general surveillance in the 
home country of the parent bank, while subsidiaries were subject to such 
monitoring in the host country. However, according to this setup, liquidity 
surveillance should have been in the hands of the British FSA, which also had 
authority to intervene in marketing of the deposit scheme in the UK. 
Interestingly, however, when setting up the accounts Landsbanki had 
negotiated exemption from the FSA liquidity surveillance until 2011 – liquidity 
surveillance of Icesave was thus only in the hands of the mother company in 
Iceland.    
At the time no one seemed to even contemplate the risk involved. 
Without any objections from either Icelandic or UK authorities, the bank 
quoted the EU/EEA directive on Depositors Guarantee Schemes, they 
insisted was in place in Iceland, which, they said, would protect all deposits up 
to €20,887. Then they referred to the British top up guaranty for the rest. This 
was however always very ambiguous.  
Kaupthing opened a similar high-yielding Internet deposits scheme, 
named Kaupthing Edge. However, unlike Landsbanki with Icesave, Kaupthing 
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used its subsidiary, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander, to host the deposits. 
Edge deposits therefore had to be kept in the UK and were under British 
banking regime surveillance. At the time, few noticed the difference, which 
after The Crash left those involved in the two cases a world apart. 
Playing on an Icelandic symbol, Icesave was marketed to tap into the 
trust associated with Nordic economies. Soon attracting the favorable 
attention of the financial media, the scheme became an instant success. The 
Sunday Times, for example, wrote enthusiastically about the scheme under 
the headline: ‘Icesave looks like a hot deal’ (Hussain, 2006). Before the end, 
Icesave had attracted almost as many savers as there were inhabitants in 
Iceland. Landsbanki had for a while enjoyed better ratings than the other two 
because it was able to tap into the Icesave deposits to keep liquidity flowing. 
This was, however, a mixed blessing, as reliance on deposits leaves a bank 
much more vulnerable to bad news than if it is funded in the wholesale 
market. Even a minor issue can result in a run if it is portrayed in the wrong 
light. Still, all three banks were passing the Icelandic Financial Supervisory 
Authorities (FME) stress tests with flying colors. In theory, the banks were all 
doing well. Amongst those buying this story was the Financial Times, which 
as late as August 2008 wrote that ‘fears of a systemic financial crisis in 
Iceland have dissipated after the country’s three main banks announced 
second-quarter results showing that they are suffering amid the downturn – 
but not too badly’ (Ibson, 2008). 
The Central Bank stretched itself to the limit to keep the banks liquid in 
domestic króna, for example accepting their own bonds as collateral – the so-
called love letters. However, to back up the overinflated banking system in 
such dire straits it needed a sizable sum in foreign currency. The Central 
Bank thus went knocking on doors in the neighboring capitals asking to open 
similar swap lines as others were negotiating, that could be drawn on in time 
of need. This was meant to boost confidence in Iceland’s capacity to back up 
the financial system. To the surprise of the government, however, apart from 
earlier limited swap-lines with the Nordics, Iceland met closed doors in most 
places. This was at a time when the neighboring states were still swapping 
much more extensive such lines.  
Not only had the banks been pushed out of the international capital 
market, but the government had as well. For the international financial system 
tiny Iceland was as a state not thought to be too big to fail. Iceland first 
approached the Bank of England in March 2008. Initially, the request was 
positively received, but with a suggestion that the IMF would analyze the 
need. A month later, the climate had changed. It had become clear that the 
central banks of Europe, the US and the UK had collectively decided not to 
assist Iceland. Later it was known that the governor of the Bank of England, 
Mervin King, offered instead to co-ordinate a multinational effort to help scale 
down our financial system. His offer was instantly turned down by the leading 
governor of the Icelandic Central Bank, Mr. Davíð Oddsson (See for example, 
Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir, 2010). 
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UK concerns  
 
When Northern Rock was running into trouble in late 2007 and taken into 
receivership in February 2008 worries over further volatility in the banking 
system were spreading in the UK, raising concerns of health of many other 
banks. By 2008 Landsbanki had collected around 4 billion pounds through the 
Icesave scheme. With the International Financial Crisis now blazing and the 
apparent wide exposure of Iceland’s oversized banking system this was 
causing increasing concerns in the UK, especially because of the poor state 
of the Icelandic Depositors Guaranty Fund holding only around 1 per cent of 
the liabilities of the Icelandic banks now facing headwind. This caused an 
avalanche of negative reporting in the UK media on the Icelandic banks. On 
5th February 2008 The Daily Telegraph for example asked in a headline: “Is 
Iceland headed for meltdown?”(“Is Iceland headed for meltdown?,” 2008). 
Subsequently increased withdrawals were almost amounting to a run on the 
bank, which the bank was barely able to withstand, before deposits 
installments were picking up again in April. 
 These events lead the British FSA to push for restructuring of the 
online branch, for example proposing revoking an exemption Icesave had 
negotiated from liquidity surveillance in the UK. This was raised in meetings 
between governors of the Icelandic Central Bank and the Bank of England on 
3d March 2008 and again in meeting the FSA had with Landsbanki 
management on 14th March 2008. In these meetings the FSA furthermore 
proposed moving the deposits to Landsbanki’s Heritable subsidiary and thus 
entirely under jurisdiction of the British Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme  (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 12, 13). For this, however, assets had to 
follow from the parent bank in Iceland to the UK, which Landsbanki had 
trouble meeting. The liability amounted to half Iceland’s GDP. Additionally 
such transfer would have to be with depositors consent, though force majeure 
situation might justify a quicker move. This was the start of increased tension 
between Iceland and the UK over the Icesave deposits, ultimately resulting in 
the UK authorities seizing the bank in October 2008 when the parent bank 
was falling in Iceland.  
The tension was heightening in frequent exchange of letters over the 
coming weeks and months. In a letter dated 29th May 2008 the FSA finally 
revoked the exemption from UK liquidity surveillance and subsequently 
demanded that the Icesave deposits be moved to subsidiary (SIC 2010, Vol. 
6, Ch. 18: 16). The FSA had concerns that neither the Icelandic Guaranty 
Fund nor the Central Bank had ability to back up the bank in time of crisis. 
The FSA also asked that the Icesave deposits would be capped at 5 billion 
pounds level which they were now reaching close to and that interests would 
be set below featuring on best buy tables (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 17). 
Landsbanki replied on 15th July 2008 agreeing with the general aim of moving 
the deposits to subsidiary but refusing both capping the deposits and the 
request of setting interest below best buy level. In the meantime the issue had 
been reported widely in the UK, for example discussed in the House of 
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Commons were MPs quoted report in The Times on 5th July stating that 
collectively the deposits of the Icelandic banks in the UK were amounting to 
13,6 Pounds or “twice the country’s entire GDP”  (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 
19). 
On July 22nd 2008 the FSA wrote back saying that Landsbanki’s reply 
was worrying, that risk of run on the bank was increasing and that the FSA 
would be forced to consider applying its legal measures against the bank if its 
requests were not being met. That is; a solid cap, solid liquidity buffer and firm 
time tabled intention of subsidiarisation. (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 19). 
Though Landsbanki voiced willingness to comply in its letter to the FSA on 
28th July it also explained why it might have difficulties in implementing what 
was being requested unless the FSA would agree on flexibility regarding 
some of its conditions in the transition period. On these conditions Landsbanki 
and the FSA were never able to agree on. While the FSA was operating in 
order to protecting UK based depositors the Landsbanki management was 
rather concerned with saving the mother bank in Iceland. These aims proved 
contradictory and caused prolonged frictions.  
The FSA was not only applying its pressure in letters and meetings 
with Landsbanki but also in ongoing correspondence with the Icelandic FME 
and Central Bank. In a letter to Landbanki on August 5th 2008 the British FSA 
demanded Landsbanki to confirm within a week how the bank would comply 
with conditions set by the FSA in order to move the Icesave deposits to its 
subsidiary in London, otherwise it might be forced to apply its formal legal 
measures (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 23). This was the second time the FSA 
threatened in a letter to directly intervene in the banks operations.   
The Icelandic Central Bank was now directly involved. Reportedly it 
considered openly defying the FSA but decided against that approach as it 
might risk the stability of the entire Icelandic financial system. On 11th August 
2008 the Icelandic FME wrote back to the FSA pleading on behalf of 
Landsbanki for flexibility while transferring Icesave to the Heritable Bank in 
London. The two surveillance authorities talked in a teleconference a week 
later where the FSA suggested that Landsbanki might sell Icesave. In the 
meantime the FSA had written Landsbanki once more on 15th August 2008, 
demanding increasing reserves to 20 per cent of deposits. At the end of the 
letter the FSA threatened for the third time that it might apply its formal 
authoritative legal measures against the bank and stop deposit collection into 
Icesave accounts (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 25). The Icelandic actors, that is, 
the Landsbanki, the Icelandic FME and the Central Bank however believed 
that would only trigger liquidity crisis – not only for Landsbanki but for all 
Icelandic banks and indeed also the UK fragile banking system.  
It was now clear that the British FSA considered Landsbanki being in 
non-compliance with its conditions and that it was already failing. The 
Landsbanki management pleaded with the Icelandic Minister of Commerce to 
intervene, who with a team of officials met with UK Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Alistair Darling in London on 2nd September 2008. Mr. Darling has 
since reported that he was disappointed with the Icelanders as he felt they did 
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not appreciate the seriousness of the situation (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 31, 
229). Following up on the meeting few days later, leading official in the British 
Treasury dealing with the Icelandic case, Clive Maxwell, called the Icelandic 
Ambassador in London, expressing the Chancellors concerns and explaining 
how politically difficult the relationship with Iceland had become in the UK. 
This was perhaps a warning that tougher measure might be taken against 
Iceland.  
In a letter on 3d September 2008 the FSA once again wrote to 
Landsbanki saying it was considering applying its formal legal measures if the 
bank would not before 8th September 2008 explain how it would comply with 
the conditions. Before the deadline Landsbanki replied by again voicing 
willingness to comply but explaining why it might be difficult to meet all the 
requests. In wake of several subsequent meetings and correspondence 
between agencies in the two countries the FSA wrote back on 17th August 
2008 announcing that it would apply its legal measures. It was now ordering 
the bank to fully comply with bringing assets to the UK to underpin 
withdrawals from Icesave accounts and in order for them being transferred 
into the British financial space (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 33). The state of the 
international financial system had by then gone from bad to worse when 
Lehman Brothers collapsed in the US on 15th September 2008.  
In a desperate reply on 19th September 2008 Landsbanki indicated that 
it would comply before turning straight to the Icelandic FME asking for help. 
The two surveillance authorities were still in correspondence on the issue 
when further trouble arose for the Icelandic banks, which I turn to next. 
Heightening pressure  
 
When a planned nationalization of one of the three banks, Glitnir, was 
announced in Reykjavik on Monday September 29th depositors were flocking 
to nearest branch and withdrawing their savings. When the news travelled 
abroad, many of the 300,000 Icesave depositors in the UK, also rushed online 
to withdraw their money from the Icesave accounts. Throughout the continent, 
central banks and governments were harmonizing their response to the crisis. 
The ECB and the Bank of England, for example, were providing massive 
liquidity to European banks, but despite a wide-ranging emergency plea, 
Iceland would not be allowed access to these funds. The same was also to 
become true in Washington. Iceland was flatly refused as neighboring 
governments collectively opposed a bailout, referring it instead to the IMF. 
Being the first Western country in four decades to surrender to the IMF was 
seen as a humiliation and a defeat for the Icelandic postcolonial project (For 
more, see Bergmann 2014b).  
In the UK, worries over the poor state of the Icelandic banks had been 
growing for some time. Since May, unsuccessful negotiations had been under 
way to move the Icesave deposits to Landsbanki’s Heritable Bank and thus 
under the cover of the UK banking scheme. On Friday 3d October the FSA 
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formally announced applying its legal measures against Landsbanki stipulated 
in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). The bank was 
already by Monday to install funds amounting 20 per cent of the Icesave 
deposits into the Bank of England, lower free access deposits to below 1 
billion pounds by end of 2008 and cap total deposits at below 5 billion pounds. 
The bank was also to bring its interest below best buy levels and halt all 
marketing of free access deposits. As Landsbanki did not at the time have 
funding available to comply this was in effect equal to killing of the bank.  
In the evening Alistair Darling called his counterpart raising concerns 
that 600 million pounds were illegally being moved out of Kaupthing and back 
to Iceland. To this Icelandic authorities had no answer. By close of market the 
same day The European Central Bank had placed a margin call of 400 million 
Euros on Landsbanki in Luxembourg, threatening to seize many of its assets. 
However, on Sunday evening the ESB revoked the call and by doing so 
releasing some of the tension.  
Thus, while Iceland was desperately trotting the globe shopping for 
money, the UK authorities and the ECB were not only refusing any funding 
but indeed pressing it for cash. The firm stand of the Bank of England, the 
ECB and the US Federal Reserve against Iceland also made the 
Scandinavian neighbours hesitant to help further. To stem the bleeding of the 
Edge and Icesave accounts, both Kaupthing and Landsbanki were frantically 
selling off assets at rock bottom prices. With the rapidly increasing flow of 
negative reporting abroad, the run on Icesave in the UK grew stronger. On 
Saturday 4th October, depositors could no longer access their accounts 
online. On the website an explanatory note read that this was because of 
technical problems. Traffic had increased more than fivefold. Really, however, 
this was not least because the bank was already exhausted by the run; it 
could no longer honour the withdrawals. Out of the £4.7 billion the 300,000 or 
so depositors held, more than £300 million ran off the accounts on that day 
alone. Foreign reporters and government authorities responded by asking 
whether Iceland would provide the same protection to foreign depositors as it 
had already announced for domestic ones. Pressure rose when the 
government struggled to find a diplomatic answer. 
Around dinnertime on Sunday 5th October British PM Gordon Brown 
called his Icelandic counterpart Geir Haarde, urging him to seek IMF 
assistance. They were old acquaintances, since both had served for years as 
finance ministers, meeting on several occasions. Brown also voiced concern 
that money amounting to more than one-and-a-half billion pounds was 
unlawfully being brought over to Reykjavik out of Kaupthing’s London 
subsidiary, Singer & Friedlander, which would not be tolerated. The amount 
had thus grown by billion pounds in only couple of days since the call from 
Darling.  
This claim of illegal money transferring out of the UK, which was 
repeated by many UK officials over these dramatic days, later proved 
unfounded as was for example stated in report to the House of Commons 
Treasury committee (2009, April). The UK was in this regard already burned 
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by Lehman Brothers, which prior to its default had sneaked back to the US 
eight billion dollars from the City of London, and would not allow the same 
thing to happen again. The call ended without a solution, with Brown all but 
begging Haarde to call in the IMF rescue team. The message from the UK 
side in frequent correspondence over the weekend was always the same: no 
bailout money would be available internationally for Iceland except through an 
IMF programme (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 20: 100).  
The UK authorities were threating to seize Icesave already by Monday. 
To halt the blow the FSA demanded 200 million pounds immediately to 
underpin Icesave and further 53 million to stabilize the Heritable Bank (SIC 
2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 145). All attempts to shift the Icesave accounts into 
British banking space had thus failed. Negotiations with the British FSA to 
allow Landsbanki to move the deposits to its London Heritable Bank and thus 
under the UK banking regime were stuck. The British were asking for more 
money alongside it than either Landsbanki or indeed the Icelandic state could 
possibly raise. The Icelandic Central Bank could only bailout one of the three 
big Icelandic banks. All of them seemed to need around 500 million Euros for 
only short-term rescue. When it came clear that Kaupthing would win the 
lottery of which to bail out, as it would have the best change of surviving, the 
light was finally out on Landsbanki. 
God bless Iceland! 
 
When the markets opened on Monday October 6th, the FME had stopped 
trading the banks’ stocks and the banks themselves froze all fund 
transactions. To counter the almost inevitable avalanche of withdrawals, the 
government issued a blanket protection for all deposits within the country. The 
UK and Netherlands were issuing top-up guarantees for deposits above the 
€20,887 stipulated in the EU directive: up to €40,000 in Holland and, by 
Wednesday, up to £50,000 in the UK. Many European states were also 
issuing complete guarantees, including Ireland, Germany, Denmark and 
Austria. Iceland was, however, only guaranteeing domestic deposits but could 
not explicitly state what would happen in foreign branches, apart from a vague 
general pledge to the effect that the banks’ Depositors and Investors 
Guarantee Fund would be ‘supported’. This would, however, always be 
difficult, as deposits in foreign branches of Icelandic banks, most of which 
were on Icesave accounts, amounted to around £8.5 billion, about 80 per cent 
of the country’s GDP, whereas the fund held only about 1 per cent of that total 
amount, which, though, was comparable to other countries. The ambiguity of 
the statements coming out of Reykjavik was thus worrying neighbors, 
especially government officials in Whitehall. 
It was clear that Landsbanki would be already defaulting the following 
day. This was a stark reversal of the bank’s situation of just a few months 
before, when it seemed to be well funded with a comfortable €800 million 
liquidity and strong inflow of foreign deposits. Furthermore, redemption of 
loans was low until late 2009. And even though it was exhausted of foreign 
cash by the run in the UK, the bank still had enough money in Icelandic króna 
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to survive this storm; the problem was that the króna was no longer tradable 
for foreign currency. This was thus a double crisis – a banking crisis and a 
currency crisis – already starting in March. 
Around noon Monday 6 the UK embassy in Reykjavik reported to 
London on events over the weekend. Interestingly the ambassador mentioned 
the Icelandic governments guaranty of domestic deposits but then indicates 
that the government had sent similar statement to London because of 
Kaupthing and Landsbankis operations in the UK (Jóhannesson, 2014). This 
was a misunderstanding but it seems clear that the UK government believed 
that such a promise had been given, that the Icelandic government would at 
least protect the minimum of EUR 20.887 (ibid). This proved to be a wrong 
interpretation of what Icelandic officials meant when stating that the Icelandic 
Depositors Guaranty Fund would be ‘supported’ (ibid), but given the fact that 
Iceland officials at the time were avoiding contact with the British and only 
providing them with as vague responses as possible (ibid) one can 
understand that there was wide room for such misunderstandings.   
In the afternoon on Monday 6 October the Icesave bank was being 
closed in the UK by formal issue of the FSA. Around the same time PM Geir 
Haarde was announcing that the Icelandic state would not have the means to 
bail out the banks. By trying so it ran a risk of being sucked with them into an 
economic abyss. (Haarde, 2008). An emergency legislation was rushed 
through parliament, which allowed the banks to be split in domestic only good 
bank surviving and bad bank taken into receivership. This method was 
according to advice of a financial specialist, Marc Dobler, sent from the Bank 
of England to Reykjavik (SIC 2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 120). The legislation also 
altered the order of payments out of the fallen banks by moving depositors to 
the front. This was a force majeure situation. The action was part of the 
defensive wall being raised around ordinary households. Foreign creditors 
would simply have to accept losing most of what they had loaned to the 
Icelandic banks.  
This was a time of chaos. UK authorities were desperately trying to get 
information out of Iceland. It didn’t help when Alistair Darling failed to get 
through to neither the Icelandic PM nor the Finance Minister, who he was 
asked to contact again the following morning. The UK government’s 
frustration was reported in correspondence throughout the evening by the UK 
ambassador with Sturla Sigurjónsson of the Icelandic Prime Ministry. He 
reported a message from London: if convincing explanations would not come 
out of Reykjavik, that would be negatively interpreted in London and might 
have serious effect on the countries bilateral relationship (SIC 2010, Vol. 7, 
Ch. 20: 147).  
Before opening of business on Tuesday morning, a board for a new 
Landsbanki had been appointed. Meanwhile, in the UK, the FSA issued a 
moratorium on Landsbanki’s London based Heritable Bank.  
With all funding opportunities closed, the situation was growing bleaker 
by the hour. As planned Alistair Darling called on Tuesday morning to discuss 
these and other grave matters with Finance Minister Árni Mathiesen. When he 
could not get a clear state guarantee out of his Icelandic counterpart, an 
assurance that UK depositors would be protected, at least up to €20,887 
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according to the EU directive, he stated that this would be ‘extremely 
damaging to Iceland in the future’ and then ended the call saying, ‘the 
reputation of your country is going to be terrible’ (“Samtal Árna og Darlings,” 
2008). Mathiesen could not but agree, but he understood from their 
conversation that he would still have some time to work things out.2 
Invoking Anti-Terrorist act 
 
Seen from the UK and the Netherlands, the situation was simply that Icesave 
depositors were left without access to their accounts. The website was 
unaccessable and no trace of the bank was left in the UK or Holland. No one 
answered the phone and there was not even an address to go to. Depositors 
were in an intolerable position – the bank had disappeared without a trace 
from the face of the earth. This caused a seriously strained relationship 
Reykjavik had with London and The Hague. The British and the Dutch 
governments decided to compensate their depositors, even beyond the 
€20,887 mark guaranteed by the EU directive. For this they demanded 
payback with interest from the Icelandic government.  
In Whitehall, preparations had been under way for dealing with the 
Icelandic crisis. Icelanders would not get away with simply cutting off their 
foreign debt, shutting the doors and leaving British citizens out in the cold. It 
did not help that UK officials had learned of the message from governor of 
Iceland’s Central Bank on TV few days earlier, in which he stated that 
foreigners could only expect between 5 to 15 per cent of their claims. The 
plan was to be kicked into action. The British claimed that giving preference to 
depositors in domestic banks over those in foreign branches was a breach of 
European regulations, which Iceland subscribed to through the EEA. 
In the early morning of Wednesday 8th October 2008 Alistair Darling 
appeared on BBC Radio 4 claiming that the Icelandic government was 
reneging on its responsibility to UK depositors, and that this would not be 
tolerated. Referring to his conversation with Iceland’s finance minister 
Mathiesen the day before he said: ‘The Icelandic government, believe it or 
not, told me yesterday they have no intention of honouring their obligations 
here’ (Darling, 2008). In a joint press conference at 9:15 Darling and Gordon 
Brown announced a massive bailout of UK-based banks, to the tune of £500 
billion. As a result of pumping the money into the banks, the British state 
acquired a majority stake in the Royal Bank of Scotland and steered the 
merger of HBOS and Lloyds TSB, in which the state had acquired third of the 
shares. There was, however, not a penny for Icelandic-owned banks in the 
UK. On the contrary, Brown claimed that Iceland’s authorities must assume 
responsibility for the failed banks and announced that the UK government had 
taken ‘legal action against the Icelandic authorities to recover the money lost 
to people who deposited in UK branches of its banks’ (quoted in Balakrishnan, 
2008). Director of the British FSA, Hector Sants, is reported to have told the 
management of Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander in the UK: ‘Those funds are 
not for you’ (SIC 2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 171). 
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Earlier in the morning, the UK FSA had called Kaupthing demanding 
£300 million instantly be moved from Reykjavik to Singer & Friedlander to 
meet the run on Edge accounts, which with the Icesave website down also 
was blazing, and then a further £2 billion over ten days. This was an 
impossible demand for Kaupthing to meet, and it instead called the Deutsche 
Bank, asking it to sell off Kaupthing’s operations in the UK. Deutsche’s 
brokers thought that could be done within 24 hours. 
The legal actions Brown had mentioned in his press brief, however, 
went much further. At 10:10 in the morning, deposits in Landsbanki’s 
Heritable Bank were moved to the Dutch internet bank ING Direct for free 
when the ‘Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008’ took effect (The Landsbanki 
Freezing Order 2008, 2008). The action was based on the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act, which had been put in place after the terrorist attacks 
in the US on 11 September 2001. Not minding that around a hundred 
thousand people worked for Icelandic-held companies in Britain, the UK 
government invoked the Anti-Terrorism Act to freeze the assets of Landsbanki 
in the UK and for a while also all assets of the Icelandic state including the 
Icelandic government, the Icelandic Financial Surveillance Authority and the 
Icelandic Central Bank (SIC 2010, Vol. 6, Ch. 18: 40).  
Later that day the FSA took control of the Heritable Bank and 
Landsbanki’s subsidiary in London. The Landsbanki Freezing Order was 
issued with an explanation reading: ‘The Icelandic authorities have 
announced that Landsbanki has been placed into receivership but has not 
given any indication as to how overseas creditors will be dealt with. The 
Icelandic Government has also announced a guarantee of all depositors in 
Icelandic branches. However, overseas depositors have not been covered by 
the guarantee. This exclusion on grounds of nationality is discriminatory and 
unlawful under the rules governing the European Economic Area. The UK 
government is taking action to ensure that Landsbanki assets are not 
transferred from the UK until the position of UK creditors becomes clearer. 
The UK authorities are seeking to work constructively with the Icelandic 
authorities to ensure speedy resolution.’   
 Subsequently, Landsbanki and for a while also Iceland’s Central Bank 
and Ministry of Finance was listed on the Treasuries home page alongside 
other sanctioned terrorist regimes, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Burma, 
Zimbabwe and North Korea.  
While Kaupthing’s CEO, Sigurður Einarsson, was in his London office 
in the late morning discussing with Deutsche Bank over the phone the fastest 
way to liquidate its assets, he read a banner running on the TV screen saying 
that the FSA had already moved Kaupthing’s Edge accounts to ING Direct in 
the Netherlands. Their phone conversation quickly ended, as there was no 
longer anything to talk about. In the afternoon, the UK authorities issued a 
moratorium on Singer & Friedlander, showed its Icelandic CEO, Ármann 
Þorvaldsson, the door and sealed the offices. This instantly prompted a flow 
of margin calls and a further run on the mother company. When the dark set 
in, Kaupthing Bank was itself taken into administration in Reykjavik. Thirty 
thousand shareholders lost all its worth. Interestingly, both the previously 
mentioned report to the House of Commons Treasury committee (2009, April) 
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and also the British FSA later found out that no money had illegally been 
moved from Singer & Friedlander to Iceland (Júlíusson, 2009), which, 
however, had been one of the main justifications for the UK’s attack on 
Iceland. 
On this same day, Thursday 9th October, Brown told BBC that the 
actions of the Icelandic government were effectively illegal and completely 
unacceptable. ‘They have failed not only the people of Iceland; they have 
failed people in Britain’ he said. Then he said his government was ‘freezing 
the assets of Icelandic companies in the United Kingdom where we can. We 
will take further action against the Icelandic authorities wherever that is 
necessary to recover money’ (quoted in “Brown condems,” 2008). Later in the 
day, Brown told Sky News that Iceland, as a state, was bankrupt and that the 
‘responsibility lies fairly and squarely with the Icelandic authorities, and they 
have a duty in my view to meet the obligations that they owe to citizens who 
have invested from Britain in Icelandic banks’ (“Brown Blasts Iceland Over 
Banks,” 2008). Iceland was being completely rebuffed. In fact, in the coming 
days Brown’s rhetoric against Iceland was only to harden. 
With UK depositors holding a stake of £700 million in Icesave, including 
many charities’ funding, Brown stated that the Icelandic authorities were now 
responsible for the deposits. Even in the UK, many were stunned by Brown’s 
harsh response to the Icelandic crisis. Many claimed that by attacking Iceland, 
a foreign actor, Brown was attempting to divert attention from difficulties at 
home, perhaps much as Margaret Thatcher had done during the Falklands 
crisis (Murphy, 2008). Initially it did indeed work. On its front page the Daily 
Mail declared ‘Cold War’ (2008) on Iceland and the Daily Telegraph screamed 
across its front page: ‘Give us our money back’ (2008). And these were 
papers that did not even support Brown or his Labour Party. 
With access to the estimated 7 billion pounds the Icelandic government 
and banks held in assets in the UK no longer being available, the wall came 
tumbling down. Invoking Anti-Terrorist legislation against a neighboring state 
and fellow NATO and EEA member was virtually an act of war. This was an 
unprecedented move against a friendly state, which cost Iceland dearly, in 
both economic and political terms. Moody’s instantly downgraded Iceland by 
three full points, to A1. Money transactions to Iceland were stopped not only 
in the UK but as a result also widely in Europe, where many banks refused to 
trade with Iceland after it had been listed in the UK with terrorist actors. The 
payment and clearing system for foreign goods collapsed. In only two days, all 
trading in króna had ceased outside Iceland’s borders.  
By Thursday 9 October 2008, almost the entire Icelandic financial 
system had collapsed in a dramatic chain of events, which later became 
known simply as The Crash. Ironically, this was a full week before Glitnir’s 15 
October deadline – which had started the whole thing.  
Explaining the UK attack  
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In hindsight it seems clear that the UK authorities went in their actions much 
further than needed in protecting British interests. Invoking the Anti Terrorist 
Act was for example in stark contrast to responses elsewhere. Authorities in 
the Netherlands, for example, saw no reason to freeze assets and in 
Stockholm the Swedish Central Bank was still trading with Kaupthing’s 
Swedish branch. In this segment I attempt explaining some of the reasons 
behind the harsh response of the UK government against Iceland. 
First thing to note is that this was a time of utter chaos, frustration and 
widespread political as well as economical upheaval. Perhaps part of the 
reason can be found in the fact that Iceland’s economic fragility turned the 
mirror on the UK and its own volatile financial situation. Economist Willem 
Buiter (2008) who had studied the state of the economy in both countries, saw 
the similarity and wrote that it was no great exaggeration to also describe the 
UK as a huge hedge fund. 
From private off-the-record interviews I conducted for this paper in late 
2013 and early 2014 with several leading UK officials, within for example the 
UK Treasury, Foreign Office and the Labour Party, who were at the heart of 
these events at the time, it seems clear that the UK government finally lost 
faith in not only the Icelandic banks but also the Icelandic government over 
the weekend from Friday 3d to Sunday 5th October, 2008. This conclusion is 
for example also supported in unpublished report Icelandic stakeholders 
commissioned a leading business investigation firm in London to conduct into 
the issue.3 The report states that the UK government believed until October 
3d 2008 that a ‘high level political deal’ was in place of fast-tracking Icesave 
deposits to British banking space. The alleged deal included stipulation of 
insurance premium to be paid by the Icelandic government, that the ‘Icelandic 
government [was] to transfer 200 million pounds to the UK’.  
How the UK authorities came to believe this deal was in place is not 
clear as no such understanding is sheared amongst Icelandic officials at the 
forefront of these events at the time, who also were interviewed off the record 
for this paper in late 2013 and early 2014. Neither are there any public 
documents available to support such alleged ‘deal’ at ‘high political level’. 
UK officials interviewed for this paper point out that this was a time of 
great uncertainty and misinformation. Long lasting still ongoing tension at the 
time between the British Foreign Office (FCO) and the Treasury had 
weakened British institutions. Under Gordon Browns premiership it is reported 
that the Treasury was leading all actions against Iceland and that the FCO 
was hardly involved. Still, the little information that was available on Icelandic 
politics within the UK government was kept at the FCO. It is furthermore 
reported that there was a serious communication malfunction between the 
Treasury, the FSA and the Bank of England. This was unfortunate as reliable 
intelligence on the Icelandic banks was rather within FSA and the Bank of 
England than in the Treasury.  
In addition to not understanding Iceland, the Treasury was overworked 
by challenges of the international financial crisis blazing at the time. It is 
furthermore reported that as relatively young and small ministry in the UK the 
Treasury was suffering from high staff turnover and thus lack of institutional 
memory. All of this combined meant that when dealing with little Iceland the 
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Treasury neither had the means nor knowledge to properly contemplate the 
highly complex situation.  
When trouble arose Iceland was thus not in focus in the Treasury, in 
fact it was rather viewed as troubling black hole preventing the UK to deal with 
the big picture. Unlike the Foreign Service the Treasury had no room to 
contemplate political implications cross borders, in dealing with Iceland this 
was just a financial issue like all others. ‘This was just nuts and bolts finance’ 
said one of this papers interviewees. While desk officers were of course 
analyzing Icelandic banks like all others, higher-level officials were ignorant 
about the place.  
One interviewee for this paper, senior official in the Foreign Service, 
said that this was in effect a failure of diplomacy. He said that on both sides 
there existed surprising lack of understanding between the two governments, 
that the Icelanders did not know British governance and the UK side was 
almost utterly ignorant about Iceland. He pointed out that even though Gordon 
Brown and Geir Haarde were on good terms and for example met at Number 
10 after Brown took office, that friendship did not amount to much at time of 
crisis. ‘To think so was foolish’, he said. 
 
Plan A and Plan B 
 
British officials interviewed for this paper pointed out that repeated references 
in FSA letters to Landsbanki to its legal authority to interfere with the banks 
operation in the UK, discussed earlier in this paper, was nothing short of 
blatant threat of seizing the bank. This warning seems, however, not to have 
been taken equally seriously in Iceland. According to British officials 
interviewed for this paper a low level and at first rather vague plan to deal with 
Iceland was slowly starting to emerge since May 2008, developing in gradual 
steps until the very end when the UK government finally struck on October 8th 
2008 with implementing of the Anti Terrorist Legislation. The plan consisted of 
two options. Plan A revolved around getting Icelandic authorities onboard with 
moving Icesave to the UK, with was to include proper insurance premium 
funds coming with it. If however, that would not work out, plan B was quite 
simply unilaterally seizing the bank.  
As mentioned before, until Friday October 3d, Treasury officials 
believed a deal was in place with Icelandic authorities. Over the weekend 
however the UK side lost faith in the Icelanders, resulting in Plan B being 
kicked into action. The above mentioned investigative reported prepared for 
Icelandic stakeholders also indicates that the UK side feared that the 
government of Iceland was loosing control over to Central Bank governor 
Davíð Oddson, the country’s previous long standing PM and that he was 
planning to ‘veto the scheme’ – that is, the alleged deal on moving Icesave 
against 200 million pound insurance premium. The report also noted an 
expectation existing in the UK that the nationalized Icelandic banks would be 
ordered to reclaim their funds from abroad following such an Oddson veto. 
Furthermore, hints of Russian rescue money flowing to Iceland caused further 
concerns of Iceland going rogue.  
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When coming to the conclusion of applying plan B, UK officials 
interviewed for this paper claim that when dealing with Iceland, Brown and 
Darling wanted to been seen as being tough on rouge bankers. They pointed 
out that Iceland was viewed to be small enough to be made an example off; 
that it might serve as stark warning to others. Thus, when the big bank bailout 
was announced on Wednesday October 8th 2008, being tough on Iceland set 
the right political tone domestically, i.e. being tough on bad bankers while also 
preventing the banking system from collapse. Thus, this was also a balancing 
act. Applying the Anti-Terrorist act against Iceland was thus purposely used 
by the UK government to send a strong message and in doing so preventing 
others from straying off from the right path.  
UK officials interviewed for this paper agree that the UK government 
had no idea what implication their action would have on the Icelandic banking 
system, that they were not thinking about Iceland as such is their actions, that 
this was quite simply only about British politics in time of crisis and that they 
did for example not contemplate Kaupthing collapsing as a result.  
This view of events is somewhat supported when examining 
conversation between Finance Minister Mathisen and Lord Paul Myners, the 
British Finanical Services Secretary, on 8th October 2008. Myners said that it 
had worried UK authorities not being able to get reliable information out of 
Iceland on whether British depositors would be compensated or not. Lord 
Myners said that the UK government had thus decided to take action in 
protecting British financial interests against Iceland (SIC 2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 
151). When discussing the issue in the House of Lords on 28th October 2008 
Myners cited the same reasons for applying the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act, that is; lack of sufficient commitment from Iceland regarding 
deposits in the UK but also adding that the actions had been necessary 
because of volatility on the UK financial market. He said it had been 
necessary to act vigorously when Iceland seemed to be taking actions hurting 
British interests (SIC 2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 154).  
Quite clearly, we can conclude that these actions were a co-ordinated 
attack that had been in the making for days, if not weeks. Indeed, it was a 
bomb, which was to blow up the defensive wall that the Icelandic government 
was trying to build around domestic households.  
When PM Haarde called in the morning on Thursday 9th October to 
complain about this brutal treatment, Brown did not even answer. Haarde was 
instead referred to Darling, who in their phone conversation justified the 
actions of the British authorities by referring to his talk with Icelandic Finance 
Minister Mathiesen two days earlier. Darling said that Mathisen had not been 
able to provide guaranty for the Icesave deposits and that he had indicated 
that obligations of the FME might not be honored. Records of their 7th October 
conversation however do not support Darlings recollection from their talk (See 
SIC 2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 152). Interestingly, when interviewed for this paper 
an senior UK Foreign Office official pointed out that Mathiesen had made a 
mistake when agreeing to talk on the phone with Darling that day, by doing so 
he had given Darling the excuse he needed to attack Iceland. The British 
official said that the phone call had made it easer for the UK to apply the 
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legislation they had already for some time been preparing to use if the need 
presented it.  
From correspondence between the UK embassy in Iceland and the 
Treasury in the UK, now partly available as way of the freedom of information 
act, the UK authorities seem to have felt quite confident of success in their 
dealings with Iceland. On late October 11th the UK ambassador reported to 
London that Treasury officials were travelling back from Iceland and that a 
deal on Icesave was within reach. UK officials discussed imminent ‘quick 
wins’ in the dispute against Iceland and contemplated ‘lifeline’ to be handed to 
Iceland after securing their victory (See in Jóhannesson, 2014).  
The Icelandic government only made weak attempts to protesting 
against these actions taken in the UK. On 13th February 2009 the UK 
Treasury finally provided explanations in a letter signed by Clive Maxwell, 
claiming that the actions were not taken on grounds of terrorist operations. 
The letter quoted instead protocol in the law saying that the Treasury can act 
against those it finds likely of being hurting British economy. The letter 
maintained that the British Treasury had believed it to be likely that the 
Icelandic government was discriminating in favor of Icelandic depositors and 
against UK and other foreign creditors. The letter quoted the 7th October 
phone call between finance ministers Mathiesen and Darling, claiming that the 
Icelandic authorities had failed to issue credible protection to foreign 
depositor. The letter also stated that the Icelandic government had provided 
contradictory information and said that the Icelandic actions were threating 
financial stability in the UK and that there was real risk of contamination (SIC 
2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 20: 155). This is somewhat different to the explanation 
Finance Minister Darling told PM Haarde in their phone call on 9th October 
2008.  
Forced agreement 
 
Though ambiguity remained over many legal aspects of this highly complex 
situation, the UK and Dutch governments were pressuring Iceland to accept 
full responsibility for the Icesave accounts. While also pressuring Iceland to 
turn to the IMF, these governments were, with the help of the EU apparatus, 
lobbying neighbouring capitals to refuse it any loans except through an IMF 
programme. Iceland’s government, however, was still afraid of the stigma of 
being the first Western state in four decades to surrender to the IMF (See for 
example, Mathiensen & Jósepsson, 2010)  
In few steps Iceland gradually caved into the collective pressure and 
sought help from the fund. To Iceland’s surprise, the IMF board refused help 
unless, Iceland was made to understand, first clearing up the Icesave dispute 
with the British and the Dutch. Initially at the IMF yearly meeting in 
Washington already on October 11, Finance minister Mathiesen signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Dutch where he agreed to an 
arbitrary court ruling on the issue. Only in its wake, on 22d October, was 
Landsbanki removed from the list of terrorist regimes on the UK Chancellor’s 
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website. This agreement was however abandoned by the Icelandic 
government upon Mathiesen’s return in Reykjavik and in November it was 
replaced with a much more broad based deal, what was called the Brussels 
Guidelines, which included EU involvement. The deal stipulated that Iceland 
would indeed accept responsibility, but that its European partners would help 
shouldering the cost. Holding out for not much more than a month, the 
government thus threw in the towel and under impossible pressure accepted 
to guarantee deposits up to the minimum €20,887 stipulated by EU law.  
The EEA connection did not amount to much. IMF assistance was only 
made available after Iceland gave into the Dutch and the British. The 
government’s apparent weakness in responding to the UK attack added to the 
public’s frustration, especially when it had become clear that no money had 
illegally been moved out of the UK.  
The initial forced Icesave agreements (The Memorandum of 
Understanding and the Brussels Guidelines) angered the public, which in 
wake of the Crash had taken to the streets in ever-greater numbers. After a 
series of protests, which later became known as the Pots and Pans 
Revolution (búsáhaldabyltinging), the grand coalition of the Independence 
Party (IP) and the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) was ousted from power 
in late January 2009, paving the way for a new left-wing government – the first 
purely left-wing coalition in the history of the republic.  
The severity of the currency crisis, which followed the banking 
collapse, can for example be seen in the fact that Iceland was the only 
country that had to revert such extreme measures as implementing capital 
controls. The economy seemed paralysed. On Friday 10 October, the first of 
many popular protests started. 
While the crisis was tightening its grip leading up to The Crash, the 
islands neighbours had refused help unless it was through an IMF 
programme. After the collapse of the banks, the IMF gradually emerged as 
the only solution as Iceland was still being isolated internationally. The British 
and Dutch governments had been successfully lobbying both the ECB and 
other European states not to aid Iceland independently, while at the same 
time pressuring Iceland to accept responsibility for the Icesave deposits. 
Iceland’s government, on the contrary, insisted that according to the relevant 
EU directive it was only obligated to ensure that a Depositors Guarantee Fund 
was in place and not explicitly responsible for foreign branch deposits 
(Blöndal & Stefánsson, 2008). Referring to a report written for the French 
Central Bank in 2000, Iceland argued that the directive did not explicitly 
dictate that the state had to pick up the balance in the event of a systemic 
collapse (Banque de France, 2000). 
This was, however, a difficult argument to get through in the crisis-
ridden climate at the time. In order to prevent a further run on their own banks 
and to regain enough credibility to keep them afloat, the British, during these 
same days, led a coalition of G20 and EU states promoting collective 
international action emphasizing almost blanket depositors protection (see, for 
example, Pilkington, 2008). Allowing Iceland to leave depositors in foreign 
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branches without such protection was seen as countering these efforts and 
indeed undermining the entire global financial system. In Whitehall, many 
feared that the Icelandic crisis was spreading to the UK, which also had 
approached the brink of widespread banking collapse. As a result, Iceland 
was being turned into an international villain. Iceland was trapped.  
Though Iceland was still stubbornly hesitating, a joint economic 
programme was informally being negotiated that would include $2.1 billion 
from the IMF and a further $3 billion from the Central Banks of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden in addition to a separate loan from Poland. 
Iceland’s resilience was however diminishing by the day. The pressure to 
accept responsibility for the Icesave deposits grew. According to some 
reports, Iceland was even threatened with being expelled from the European 
Economic Area (EEA), its economic lifeline to the outside world 
(Hálfdanardóttir, 2008). With dwindling foreign reserves and at risk of a 
serious shortage of, for example, medicine, food and other necessities from 
abroad, Iceland finally threw in the towel and applied to enter the IMF 
emergency program on 25 October. 
 
IMF blockade 
 
Based on informal query the government expected that the IMF board would 
accept Iceland’s application on 3 November (Sveinsson, 2013). In the 
meantime, however, the British and Dutch governments, which previously had 
been pressuring Iceland to go to the IMF, were now lobbying behind the 
scenes against Iceland being allowed into the program unless first accepting 
responsibility for the Icesave accounts (Duncan, 2008). The NRC 
Handelsblad in the Netherlands reported that the blockage was being 
orchestrated by Dutch Finance Minister Wouter Bos and his British colleague 
Alistair Darling (Banning & Gerritsen, 2008). Later, the chief IMF 
representative in Iceland admitted to a block of not only the British and Dutch 
governments but also the Nordic states (Rozwadowski, 2013).   
When Iceland would not concede, the IMF board postponed its 
decision and made clear that the plea would be blocked until accepting of 
liability for Icesave. During this time, a senior advisor in the IMF’s external 
relations department publicly acknowledged that the delay was directly due to 
unresolved disputes with Holland and the UK (Transcript of Press Briefing by 
David Hawley, 2008). As Iceland was not a member of the EU and thus not 
subject to the European Court of Justice, and as the EFTA Court had no 
jurisdiction in the UK and the Netherlands, there seemed at the time to be no 
available legal body to rule on the dispute – apart from the previously 
mentioned initial arbitrary court that Finance Minister Mathiesen had felt 
forced to agree to on October 11 but the Icelandic government later 
abandoned on the ground that it was skewed in favor of the UK and Holland 
through the EU’s involvement. 
Iceland was thus caught in a tight spot. It needed money to prevent 
further deterioration of the already devastated economy but that meant 
agreeing to liabilities it did not want to accept. According to the Brussels 
Guidelines brokered by the French EU Presidency the government of Iceland 
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agreed to cover the deposits of depositors in the Icesave accounts in 
accordance with EEA law. Iceland was to repay the Icesave dept over ten 
years, starting three years after signing, with 6.7 per cent interest on the loan. 
The agreement also entailed that the EU would continue to participate in 
finding arrangements that would allow Iceland to restore its financial system 
and economy. This was a precondition Iceland set for paying out according to 
the agreement. A stabilization package of financial assistance from the IMF 
was an explicit part of the agreement, which was to be discussed at the IMF 
Executive Board meeting on Wednesday 19 November (Agreed Guidelines, 
2008). 
Though these early agreements on the Icesave deposits were meant to 
end the quarrel, the dispute was only just starting. Ambiguity still remained. To 
keep up the pressure, and even to increase it, the Dutch Foreign Minister, 
Maxime Werhagen, threatened to veto Iceland’s EU bid in July 2009 (The 
Hague Threatens Iceland, 2009). The government justified the signings by 
claiming that it had had no choice. Either it bit the bullet and accepted 
responsibility or the country would remain frozen out, thus without access to 
vital imports such as medicine and food. The government explained that no 
one supported us; not even the Nordic neighbours were willing to listen to 
Iceland’s legal arguments. Without agreement, Iceland would no longer have 
been considered a modern state, internationally recognized as equal to 
others, but would rather have been relegated to being an isolated outpost 
surviving on local agriculture and fisheries alone. The signing was, however, a 
serious blow to the countries political identity, as the postcolonial national 
identity insisted on not giving in to foreign pressure. It thus caused great strain 
domestically (Bergmann, 2014b).  
After Iceland’s concession to the British and the Dutch over Icesave, 
the general public took to the streets in even greater numbers than before, 
now not only protesting against our government’s mismanagement of the 
economy but also against apparent foreign oppression. Frustration grew as 
businesses closed and more and more people were laid off while inflation 
rose to 20 per cent. The protest was now spreading around the country.  
Icesave II and III 
 
The new left-wing government parachuted in on the canopy of the Pots-and-
Pans revolution contested some of the premises of the Brussels Guidelines, 
which they claimed was unlawfully imposed by foreign forces. Under the 
leadership of Finance Minister Sigfússon, chairman of the Left Green 
Movement, the new government abandoned the multinational approach and 
instead sent their representatives to London and The Hague to renegotiate 
terms. This result, which in effect was merely a loan agreement with the 
foreign ministers of the Netherlands and the UK, where Iceland accepted to 
cover up to €4.5 billion, instantly became one of the most unpopular 
agreements in the history of the country. Only after it’s signing however was 
the freezing order on Landsbanki and related Icelandic assets lifted. 
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Similar delaying tactics within the IMF on reviews, as when entering the 
program initially, was furthermore confirmed in a report by the Independent 
Evaluation Office of the IMF into its response to the financial crisis. The report 
spoke of ‘the active involvement of (at least some) Nordic countries served to 
delay the first review by several months because […] pressure […] by their 
European partners not to provide financing assurances in an attempt to 
influence the outcome of the ongoing discussion on the extent of deposit 
guarantees for Icesave.’ (￼Independent Evaluation Office of the International 
Monetary Fund, 2014) 
Parliament reluctantly accepted the agreement, but only after adding to 
it new preconditions, referring to Iceland’s ability to pay. These the UK and the 
Dutch refused. A new negotiation committee was thus formed, which was able 
to lower the interest rate a little further. After a fierce debate, the amended 
agreement was accepted in Parliament on the last day of December 2009. 
The new government was now also accused of caving in to foreign pressure 
and surrendering Icelandic interests to external forces.  
The saga took a dramatic turn on 5 January 2010, when the President 
of Iceland, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, denied signing the law necessary to 
ratify the new agreement after receiving a petition of 60,000 Icelanders asking 
him to reject the deal. (He had signed the revoked earlier one). This was an 
exceptional move.  
In early 2010, Icelanders once again found themselves in unknown 
waters. A quarter of the electorate had signed a petition to be put to the 
President asking him to veto the bill, which subsequently was refused by 90 
per cent of voters. The country was in a mood of defiance. Many felt betrayed 
by the UK government when it had invoked the Anti-Terrorist Act – an action 
that ultimately drove our last bank into the ground. Icelanders therefore found 
the idea that they should foot the whole bill alone difficult to swallow. There 
was also a legal twist. The EU directive upon which the British and Dutch had 
based their claim was rather unclear. It stipulated only that states are obliged 
to set up special deposit guarantee schemes. It did not speak of a state 
guarantee. Many Icelanders were thus frustrated by the fact that the British 
and the Dutch had refused the request for an impartial court to rule on the 
issue. 
The general perception in Iceland was thus that the government had 
again been bullied by an overwhelming foreign power into signing an unjust 
agreement. It is generally accepted that the government and Parliament only 
accepted the initial deals to achieve other ends, rather than because they felt 
under obligation to pay. It was simply a necessary evil to gain access to the 
IMF. And then there was the cost. €4.5 billon might have seemed a small 
figure by UK standards but this was almost half Iceland’s GDP. Divided by 
Iceland’s small population, the bill amounted to more than €12,000 per head, 
or just under €50,000 per household. If Landsbanki’s assets deteriorated any 
further, this would place a devastating burden on an already debt-ridden 
population. 
In addition to the wide-ranging general feeling of frustration, the 
appearance of leniency towards the British and Dutch spurred a new wave of 
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protest in mid-2010, which heightened when Parliament resumed in the early 
autumn, to find thousands of protesters surrounding the building, once again.  
After twice going back on signed agreements (in addition to 
abandoning the two initial deals), the government found it difficult to go 
knocking on doors in London and The Hague asking to renegotiate the deal 
once again. Headed by a hired American negotiator, the new team was 
nevertheless in the end able to bring the interest rate down to 3 per cent. This 
time, a large majority emerged in Parliament when the IP joined ranks with the 
government in backing the new deal. The Progressive Party (PP) though still 
opposed any agreement. Yet, to the surprise of most, President Grímsson 
also refused the third agreement. In a second referendum, on 9 April 2011, 
the new agreement was refused by a two-thirds majority, illustrating a clear 
division between Parliament and the public. Now, there was no longer 
anything to negotiate. The case was sent to the EFTA Court, where the EU 
was backing the claim of the UK and the Netherlands and the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority against Iceland. Finally, on 28 January 2013, the court 
ruled in favour of Iceland, which was vindicated of wrongdoing in its handling 
of the Icesave deposits (Judgment of the Court, 2013). The court refused the 
EU’s and the UK and the Dutch governments claim of a state guarantee, such 
as Iceland had been forced to accept in the earlier Icesave agreements. Later 
UK and Holland filed a much more limited claim before court in Reykjavik, still 
pending judgment at time of writing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Internationally the Icesave dispute reveals interesting contestation and 
(re)production of constitution of international legality as here has been 
described. Not fitting into neatly compartmentalized law, development of 
international legality has in this paper been traced throughout the course of 
this particular crisis. Domestically the issue was dictating politics in the post-
crisis period in Iceland. To the surprise of many Icelanders, after the Crash 
had left Iceland in financial ruin, the Dutch and the British still enjoyed the full 
backing in the Icesave debacle of our neighbors in the European community. 
The UK and Dutch authorities were able to use both the EU and the IMF to 
pressure Iceland into accepting responsibilities that Iceland’s authorities never 
believed were theirs to shoulder.  
 From interviews with UK officials conducted for this paper is seems 
clear that the UK side believed that an high level political deal was in place 
with the Icelandic government of fast tracking Icesave into the UK banking 
space and that the deal included insurance premium injection from Iceland of 
200 million pounds. Interestingly, though, Icelandic officials claim not to have 
any knowledge of such a deal. It is furthermore evident that the UK 
government lost faith in Icelandic authorities during the weekend 3d to 5th 
October 2008, finally kicking into action plan B of attacking Iceland by use of 
the Anti Terrorist act, which had for a while been in the making in 
Westminister. When doing so it served the UK government well to take a 
tough stand on Iceland, while simultaneously bailing out banks domestically – 
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being tough on Iceland became a balancing act, serving the purpose of 
sending tough message to others when announcing the massive bank bailout.  
The Icesave case illustrates that in time of crisis international muscle 
power still prevails. In time of need small states have difficulties when 
defending off larger states sharp attacks. In a European context, being 
formally a non-EU member made it easier for the UK and Holland to deploy 
the EU apparatus to pressure Iceland than they would against a fellow 
member state. The illusion of a shelter amongst the family of Nordic states 
was furthermore also shattered during Iceland’s Crash, which was therefore 
not only economic but also political and indeed psychological. Iceland had 
been frozen out in terms of diplomatic relations. Suffering the deepest crisis in 
its postwar history, the country was already sucked dry of foreign cash when 
the IMF finally opened its doors in November 2008, after Iceland had, under 
coercion, finally agreed to guarantee the Icesave deposits. By use of delaying 
tactics of reviews within the IMF the UK was with the help of some of the 
Nordics able to maintain the pressure on Iceland. However, after the 
immediate crisis was over, it was as well through European institution, amid 
the EFTA Court, that Iceland, as a small state, was finally able to escape from 
under the pressure applied by the British and Dutch governments.  
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